Abstract -This paper studies pricing as a means for resource allocation in a wireless Direct-Sequence @S)-CodeDivision Multiple-Access (CDMA) system. We consider the forward link of a single cell with orthogonal codes and voice traffic. The base station announces a price per unit transmitted power and a price per code, and the users respond according to their individual utilities. The objective is to set prices to maximhe either total user utility or total revenue. The solution to the former problem (maximize utility) is presented. To study the latter problem we derive the large system revenue as the number of users and codes tend to infinity with 6xed ratio. The large system revenue depends on the distribution of utilities and path loss across the user population, and may not be a unimodal function of the prices. Numerical results based on a simple model €or user utility show how the optimal prices and revenue vary with the offered load.
I. INTRODUCTION This paper presents a framework for studying the use of pricing to allocate resources in a wireless DS-CDMA system. Unlike other approaches to resource allocation, pricing can allocate resources according to perceived user utility, thereby increasing the overall utility of the network. Other attractive properties include the accommodation of a wide range of traffic flows, and potential simplification or elimination of explicit admission control policies.
Here we consider the forward link of a single cell with M orthogonal codes. We assume that only voice users are present, and that the set of user requests is stationary. Although this situation is quite simple, it serves to illustrate the framework for performance analysis, which can be generalized to account for mixed traffic types and multiple cells.
For the case considered, CDMA "resources" are transmitted power and number of codes. Each user has a utility function which is the amount the user is willing to pay for a given Quality of Service (QoS). The base station announces a price per unit transmitted power ap and a price per code ac, and each user responds by requesting service to maximize hidher individual surplus (utility minus cost). The goal is to setprices to maximize either total user utility or total revenue subject to In that case, the users need not be charged by the base, and the prices serve as internal network parameters for resource allocation. Total revenue would likely be used if the base does not know the individual utility functions, and the users are directly charged by the base. We first formulate the preceding constrained optimization problems with a finite fixed user set. The prices which maximize utility are easily obtained. The prices which maximize revenue are more difficult to determine, and we resort to a large system analysis, in which the number of users K and the number of codes M tend to infinity with fixed K I M . Both total utility and revenue can then be expressed in terms of the prices, and distribution functions of user utility and received power. We find that the revenue function is not always unimodal, but give some specific conditions which guarantee unimodality when aP = 0. We also show how the optimal prices and revenue vary with offered load numerically based on a simple model for user utility and received power distribution.
Pricing of resources in communications networks in general has received much attention during the past few years (see, for example [ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] ). Work related to that presented here on pricing for resource allocation in wireless systems is reported in [7, 8, 9] . In that work, the emphasis is on conserving battery life for the reverse link, and the model is based on a non-cooperative game. We consider a different model based on the forward link, and present a different approach to evaluating performance.
FORWARD LINK CDMA MODEL
We consider a single cell in isolation and assume that each active user is assigned one code from the base. Furthermore, we ignore multiple-access interference at the receiver (mobile), which corresponds to the situation in which the codes are orthogonal and multipath is negligible (or is equalized). The received Signal-to-Interference Plus Noise Ratio (SINR) for user IC is then 'yk = h&/No , where hk is the attenuation to user IC, P k is the forward link transmitted power to user k, and NO is the background noise level. The transmitted power needed to achieve the target SINR y* is therefore Pl = Noy*/hk. The attenuation hk depends on the location of the user and on random shadowing. We therefore assume that hk is chosen from some probability density function (p.d.f.) fh, which in turn determines the transmitted power p.d. f. across users fp. For the numerical results that follow, we assume that the received power at distance r from the base is given by where P R (~~) is the received power at a close-in reference point do in the far field region of the transmitter antenna, and n is the path loss exponent. We assume that P~( d 0 )
is the same as the transmitted power from the base station so that constant and hk = Cr-".
In what follows, we will assume that users are distributed uniformly throughout the cell, and that n = 4. Assuming that the SINR requirement is satisfied for each user, the density of transmitted powers over the user population is given by Pk = PR(do), and T k = PkCT-n/No, where c = dg is a where R denotes the cell radius. Of course, other distributions can be derived which account for additional propagation and system effects such as random shadowing and soft hand-off.
Each user is assigned a uti€ityfunction, which reflects the user's willingness to pay in dollars vs. the received QoS. For voice traffic, the QoS is determined by the received SINR. If the received SINR is above a certain threshold, y*, we assume that the user gets acceptable service and is indifferent to an increase in received SINR. Conversely, if the received SINR is less than y*, then the QoS is unacceptable and the user derives zero utility. For the numerical results which follow, user k is assigned a steputility function Uk(7) = uk, y > y*, Uk(y) = 0, y < T*, where y* is the target SINR for acceptable voice quality (say, 3 to 7 dB). The utility derived by user k, uk, is assumed to be chosen from some distribution f~. Of course, utility functions which correspond to other types of traffic can also be considered within this framework.
The base announces a price per code a, and a price per unit power c y p . The total charge for service to user k is therefore cyc + QpPk. Each user responds by maximizing the received surplus (utility minus cost). For a step utility function, this implies that
Clearly, as the prices increase, the number of active users decreases. Among the users that have the same path loss hk, those with the highest utilities remain active. Among the users that have the same utility, those with better channels (less requested transmitted power) are more likely to remain active.
The power radiated by the base causes interference to adjacent cells, and therefore represents an economic externality. To account for this, we assume that the base makes a transferpayment to the network given by PPtot, where p is a constant and Ptot is the total power radiated by the base. Ideally, /3 should depend on the load in neighboring cells. Note that p can also be interpreted as a Lagrange multiplier which enforces a constraint on Ptot.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
The objective of the base is to set the prices ac and cyp to maximize total utility or revenue minus the total transfer payment, that is, We constrain (cyc, op) to lie in the "easible region"
in which the number of active users ( I S I ) is no greater than the number of codes M (i.e., demand does not exceed supply).
Whenever (8) 2 p p k ) . In that case, the system is demand-limited, i.e., the total utility is limited by the number of users which contribute positive utility to Utot. If MI = M . then the system is code-limited, i.e., the total utility is limited by the number of available codes (bandwidth). The prices which maximize revenue are not as easy to determine. As the prices increase, the number of active users decreases, but the revenue per user increases. Optimization becomes difficult with a set of finite users since Rtot as a function of a, and ap is an irregular surface that has many jumps corresponding to the specific prices at which users become activated or deactivated.
IV. LARGE SYSTEM ANALYSIS
To avoid the associated analytical problems with a finite system, we compute the large system revenue and utility by letting the number of users, K , and the number of codes, M , tend to infinity while keeping the load p = K / M constant. In the limit, the utility per user Ut,t/K and revenue per user Rt,t/K each converge to deterministic values, and where Q = {(u,P) : P I (U -a c ) / a p ) (13) is the large system limit of the set S given in (6). (We can also view U and R as the expected utility and revenue per user, respectively, where expectation is with respect to the random variables u k and P k with p.d.f.'s fu and fp. ) We wish to select (a,, aP) to maximize U or R subject to the feasibility constraint
which is the large system version of (8) . Maximizing utility is equivalent to maximizing the number of active users that satisfy u k 2 p p k .
In analogy with the solution for the finite system, we have the following theorem. or a, = 0 ifno positive number can satisfr (15) .
An immediate inference from Theorem 2 is that when p 5 1, ac = 0 is always true. As load increases, the system transits from demand limited to code limited and the optimal a, increases whereas ap remains fixed. The carried load is therefore determined by a, alone.
To determine the prices that maximize revenue, we can take derivatives of R with respect to a, and ap. Setting 
The right side of (16) represents the gain in revenue due to a marginal increase in a,, and the left side of (16) represents the corresponding loss in revenue due to users becoming inactive after the price increase.
Similarly, setting dR/dcrp = 0 gives These terms have the analogous interpretations as those in (1 6).
When cyp = 0 these conditions can be used to obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3: For f p given by (2) and ap = 0, and given any concave utility densityfunction fu, R(a,,O) is a unimodal function of ac.
Unimodality is an important property of the revenue objective function, since it implies that simple gradient search techniques can be used to maximize revenue without a priori knowledge of the users' utility functions. Although we have not succeeded in proving this for ap > 0, we have observed from numerical results that Theorem 3 remains valid for all concave utility functions fu considered. We remark that the revenue is not a unimodal function for arbitrary fu and fp.
For example, the utility distribution fu(u) = a16(u -U1) +
( 1 -al)6(u -U2) consisting of two impulse masses at U1 and Uz typically leads to a non-unimodal revenue function. is uniform from U1 = 1 to U2 = 15, p = 5, p 5 1 and fp is given by (2) . In this case the revenue cost function is unimodal, and the global maximum occurs at ac = U2/2 and ap = p / 2 . Based on further numerical results with different parameter sets (Ul, U2, p), we conjecture that for uniform distribution fu(u) between U1 and U2 and when the load p 5 1 , the optimal (revenue maximizing) prices are:
for U2 2 2Ur a,* = U1 a; = 0 for U2 < 2U1
The large system average power per code can be evaluated as and depends on (ac, cyp, p). As an example, for the case ,f3 = 15, U1 = 1, U2 = 15, the average power per code with the optimal (ac, c y p ) is 2.3 dB less than if ap = 0 and a, alone is chosen to maximize revenue. If p = 20, then this difference increases to 3.6 dB. This is due to the fact that as increases, the more stringent the power constraint becomes, and the more important ap is for discriminating against users who have high path loss. Namely, as ap increases, the distribution of active users becomes skewed more towards the center of the cell, reducing the average power per code. Figure 2 shows the conditional probability that a user is active given its distance from base when p ,< 1. It verifies that as p and/or ap increase, the distribution of active users indeed becomes skewed more toward the center of the cell, Figure 3 shows two sets of curves. First, revenue is plotted as a function of load K I M with optimal (revenue maximizing) Figure 4 shows utility as a function of load with prices selected to maximize revenue and maximize utility, respectively. The difference in the resulting utility is the greatest when the load is less than 2. Both systems are demand-limited when the load is less than 1 and code-limifed when the load is greater than 2. However, the utility-maximizing system is code-limited when the load is between 1 and 2, while the revenue-maximizing system is demand-limited in this interval. The two curves converge as the load increases above 2.
These results illustrate that the benefit derived from pricing of power increases as resources (namely, power) become more limited. The fact that revenue increases indicates that pricing selects those users who derive the highest utility from the network. For the model considered, an explicit admission control policy is unnecessary.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied pricing as an approach to forward-link resource allocation in a wireless CDMA network. The base station sets prices for codes and transmitted power, and the users respond by maximizing individual surplus. The system goal is to set prices to maximize either total utility or revenue. Large system optimization problems were formulated in which the large system utility and revenue depend on the distribution of powers and utitilies across the user population. This enables a framework for studying the effect of load and prices on system performance. Whereas the prices that maximize utility can be explicitly determined for arbitrary utility and power distributions, this appears to be difficult for the revenue objective function. Still, the behavior of the revenue as a function of load and prices can be observed numerically.
Our analytical and numerical results indicate that for the step utility function considered, the revenue function is unimodal for a large class of utility distributions. Numerical examples show that pricing for power increases the total utility or revenue, and that this benefit increases with load. Conversely, power pricing can reduce the average transmitted power for a given total utility. Of course, the analytical framework presented here can be used to study the performance with different utility functions, such as those corresponding to data services. Pricing for multi-cell resource allocation is currently being studied.
